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COMMENTS
COURT CONTROL OVER THE VOIR DIRE EXAMINA-
TION OF PROSPECTIVE JURORS
The inherent power of state courts to make rules governing practice
and procedure has long been recognized, its exercise subject only to the
qualification that they be reasonable, and, of course, constitutional. It is
the purpose of this comment to determine whether Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 24-11 meets this test. Promulgated in 1958, the laudable objec-
tive of the drafters was to remove the scandalous delay in jury trials.2
Specifically, the rule was aimed at accelerating the selection of the jury by
giving the court unprecedented control over the voir dire examination of
prospective jurors.
In the course of this comment, attention will be directed to whether this
unprecedented control conflicts with those dictates of reasonableness and
constitutionality. In regard to the latter, the voir dire rule will be squared
against the guarantees of the right to trial by jury set forth in the Illinois
Constitution,3 and the right to counsel guaranteed by both our state4 and
federal constitutions. 5 The scope of this inquiry will be limited to the
field of criminal law. It is felt that such inquiry is timely in view of the
increasing supervision by the United States Supreme Court over proce-
dural due process in state prosecutions.
BACKGROUND
The voir dire examination is a pre-trial procedure of great importance.
It means literally, "to speak the truth," and is generally viewed as having
the two-fold purpose of enabling counsel to challenge for cause, if cause
1 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, S 101.24-1 (1963): "The judge shall initiate the voir dire
examination of jurors in civil and criminal cases by identifying the parties and their
respective counsel and he shall briefly outline the nature of the case. The judge shall
then put to the jurors any questions which he thinks necessary, touching their quali-
fications to serve as jurors in the cause on trial. The parties or their attorneys shall be
allowed a reasonable opportunity to supplement such examination, but shall not di-
rectly or indirectly examine jurors concerning matters of law or instructions." Adopted
Sept. 17, 1958.
2 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON LIMITATION OF VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION, FIFTH
ANNUAL ILLINOIS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, June 12, 1958. The members of the drafting
committee were: Judge Alan E. Ashcraft, Chairman; Judge Robert E. English; Judge
Henry J. Ingram; Judge Thomas E. Kluczynski; Judge Wm. C. Radliff; and Judge Roy
J. Solfisburg.
3 ILL. CoNsr. art. 2, §§ 5, 9. 5 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4 ILL. CONsT. art. 2, S 9. 644 WORDS AND PHRASES 598 (1962).
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exists, or to exercise the right of peremptory challenge when it is deemed
advisable. 7 The ultimate aim is the selection of a juror who is both fair
and impartial,8 a "liber homo .. . that hath such freedom of mind as he
stands indifferent as he stands unsworn."9
The right of challenge is an ancient right having evolved from the
common law with the institution of the jury itself.'0 Although the origin
of trial by jury be buried deep in antiquity," there is evidence suggest-
ing that it was used in England in the day of the Conqueror.12 Under-
standably, these early juries bore little resemblance to the institution as it
came to be known,'13 but by the twelfth century, Glanville tells of that
practice whereby jurors were "excepted against by the same means by
which Witnesses in the Court Christian are justly rejected.' 1 4 Early statu-
tory reference to challenges appear during the reign of Edward I,15 in a
period characterized by an abundance of legislation, and similar mention is
made in the reign of his grandson.
16
Sir Edward Coke told of those two general types of challenges cogniza-
ble at common law.17 They were either to the array, that is to the entire
panel; or to the polls, meaning objections to particular jurors. It is to this
latter group that our attention is directed. By the reign of Henry VI,' s
challenges to the polls were divided into peremptory challenges, which
could be exercised in capital cases at the discretion of the accused, 19 and
7 Donovan v. People, 139 I1. 412, 28 N.E. 964 (1891).
S People v. Cravens, 375 Ill. 495, 31 N.E.2d 938 (1941); Coughlin v. People, 144 Ill.
140, 33 N.E. 1 (1893). See also, Riave, Fair and Impartial Trial by jury in the United
States and in England, 50 A.B.A. J. 232 (1964.)
9 Co. LIr. 155a (Thomas ed. 1836).
10 Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892).
11 A learned controversy exists among respected authorities as to whether trial by
jury antedates the Conquest. In support of the view that it was employed by the Saxons
as early as the days of Ethelred, see 2 HALLAM, MIDDLE AGES ch. 7; 3 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 349 (12th Ed. 1794). But cf., 1 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF THE
ENGLISH LAW 119-120 (1895); FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 44 (1875); HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 207 (Howe ed. 1963).
12 FORTESQUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAR 66 (Gregor trans. 1874), where it is said
that the first true instance of trial by jury occurred in the reign of the Conqueror, "in
a cause in which Gundulph, Bishop of Rochester, was a party, and was tried before
the Bishop of Baicux."
13 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 317-320 (3rd ed. 1922).
14 GLANVILLE, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE KINGDOM OF ENGLAND
50 (Beames and Beale Ed. 1900).
15 33 EDW. 1 STAT. 4 (1305). 17 Co. LITT. 156a (Thomas ed. 1836).
16 25 EDw. 3 STAT. 5, c. 3 (1350). 18 1422-1461.
19 Supra note 12 at 253, where it appears that "in favour of life, he may challenge
five and thirty such as he most feareth and suspecteth, who, upon such challenge shall
COMMENTS
challenges for cause. This latter group likewise had two subdivisions. There
were principal challenges which were tried by the court and for which
there were four recognized grounds, 20 and challenges to the favour which
included the most infinite of conceivable objections to the venireman.21
These were decided by triors who were summoned from the vicinage for
this purpose alone.22
Though the evolutionary trends of the common law have, in effect,
eliminated the divisions of challenge for cause, the influence of Coke is
still apparent. The statutory grounds contained in our Jurors Act 23 strike
a similar note to those which disqualified as a matter of law in Stuart
England;24 and though Illinois never accepted the practice whereby
triors were summoned to determine challenges "to the favour," 25 that in-
finite host of common law grounds remains with us today.2 6 It is still a
proper ground of challenge that the venireman was a member of the
grand jury returning the indictment,27 has a pecuniary interest in the out-
come of the case,28 refuses to convict upon circumstantial evidence, 29
maintains conscientious scruples against capital punishment,30 or has a
fixed and definite opinion touching the merits of the case.3 '
be struck out of the Panel ... " Though the Crown originally exercised the right of
peremptory challenge, this practice ceased with the Ordinance for Inquests, supra
note 16. Today, the right is afforded either party, infra note 71.
20 Co. Lirr. 156-158 (Thomas ed. 1836). These were: (1) Propter honoris respectum,
where the exalted position of the party summoned rendered him above the task of jury
duty; (2) Propter defectum, which included mental incompetence, alienage, and non-
age; (3) Propter affectum, where the relation of the parties was such that a suspicion of
bias arose as a matter of law; and (4) Propter delictum, which was invoked when the
prospective juror had been convicted of treason or a felony.
211d. at 157a.
22 United States v. Watkins, 28 Fed. Cas. 419 (No. 16, 649) (1829).
28 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, sec. 12 (1874) stipulates that jurors may be challenged if
they: (1) lack any of the statutory qualifications such as age, capacity, character,
knowledge of the English language, etc.; (2) have served as a petit juror within one
year in any court of record in the county; (3) are party to a suit pending in that court.
24 Supra note 20.
25 O'Fallon Coal Co. v. Laquet, 198 Ill. 125, 64 N.E. 767 (1902).
26 1 THOMPSON, TRIALS ch. 3 (Early, 2nd ed. 1918).
27People v. Mooney, 303 Ill. 469, 135 N.E. 776 (1922).
28 Moore v. Edmunds, 384 Ill. 535, 52 N.E.2d 216 (1943).
29 Gates v. People, 14 III. 433 (1853).
30 People v. Carpenter, 13 Ill. 2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 100 (1958).
31 Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1, 12 N.E. 865 (1887) where the court adopted the rule
established by Justice Marshall in the trial of Aaron Burr. In order to be disqualifying,
the opinion must ". . . close the mind against the testimony, combat that testimony and
resist its force." United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 51 (No. 14,692g) (1807).
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As the right to challenge became more firmly entrenched, it was natu-
ral that implicit in its exercise was the right to examine prospective jurors
upon the voir dire. 2 In England, counsel was required to make his chal-
lenge before propounding interrogatories to the venireman, 8 and though
the English rule was originally followed on this side of the Atlantic, it
was subsequently replaced by the more logical practice of permitting
some type of pre-challenge examination.8 4
Prior to the adoption of Rule 24-1 in Illinois, the permissible scope of
inquiry on the voir dire, by both the People and the accused, was exten-
sive.35 Although the conduct of the examination lay within the sound
judicial discretion of the court, and was subject to reasonable limitation,
it was early recognized in Donovan v. People80 that the right of chal-
lenge was so highly cherished that the courts were not authorized to pre-
scribe rules which rendered it unavailing. Furthermore, in Donovan, the
court adopted the Michigan rule set forth in Stephens v. People, 7 recog-
nizing that the right to examine was personal to counsel. Though other
jurisdictions permitted no direct examination by counsel,3 in Illinois, this
was long deemed a valuable and substantial right.39
RULE 24-1
What then, were the changes wrought by the advent of our present
Supreme Court Rule. Basically, there were two. First, as noted earlier, the
degree of control vested in the court was marked. The mandate was
clear: "The judge shall initiate the voir dire ... briefly outline the nature
of the case . . . then put to the jurors any questions which he thinks
necessary. '40 Recalling that the primary aim sought in the adoption of
Rule 24-1 was the expediting of jury trials, it is evident that the specific
evil to be remedied was the alleged "interminable examination of jurors."4
82 Lavin v. People, 69 I11. 303 (1873).
88 Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: The English Practice, 16 GEo. L.J. 438
(1928).
84 Tone, New Supreme Court Rule 24-1: How It Works, 47 ILL. B.J. 140 (1958).
35 People v. Murawski, 2 Ill. 2d 143, 117 N.E.2d 88 (1954).
36 139 I11. 412, 28 N.E. 964 (1891).
87 38 Mich. 739 (1878).
8 8 Burns v. State, 226 Ala. 117, 145 So. 436 (1933); Cross v. State, 89 Fla. 212, 103
So. 636 (1925); McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 146 A.2d 194 (1959); State v. King, 158
S.C. 251, 155 S.E. 409 (1930). In the federal courts, the granting of such examination
is discretionary with the judge. See, FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a).
89 American Bridge Works v. Pereira, 79 I11. App. 90 (1898).
4 0 Supra note 1.
41 Mithin v. Jeffery, 259 I11. 372, 376, 102 N.E. 778, 780 (1913). It is possible that the
court was referring to the Spies case, supra note 31, in which eight defendants were
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That there was any basis for this charge, at least in regard to the criminal
practitioner, has not been made certain. The conduct if the voir dire
has always been subject to the sound judicial discretion of the court,42 and
the trial judge was never required to watch idly while counsel engaged
in useless fishing expeditions. Furthermore, it was generally understood
by counsel that a prolonged and tedious examination usually worked to
the detriment of their client's interest. 43
The second change occasioned by the adoption of the rule pertains to
the scope of permissible inquiry by counsel. Though counsel was given
the opportunity of "supplementing such examination," an express pro-
hibition was placed upon examining jurors in regard to "matters of law
or instruction."' 44 The impact of this prohibition was keenly felt, for prior
to the adoption of Rule 24-1, wide latitude had been afforded counsel in
his examination. It had long been recognized that counsel had the right to
advise the prospective jurors generally concerning the law of the case,
and to conduct a reasonable examination of them on this subject.45 In-
quiry might well be made as to whether the venireman understood and
accepted the law, including the facts that the grand jury was only an ac-
cusatory body,46 that the indictment it returned was merely a formal
charge necessary to place the defendant upon trial,47 that the defendant
was presumed to be innocent of this charge, and that this presumption
remained throughout the trial until the juror was convinced of the de-
fendant's guilt beyond all reasonable doubt,48 that the burden of proving
this guilt was on the State, and the defendant need not prove his inno-
cence, 49 and finally, that should the defendant choose not to testify, his
cause could not be prejudiced, but should he elect to take the stand, he
was entitled to a hearing as well.50
This is not to suggest that the right to examine as to matters of law was
limited to the accused alone. On the contrary, it was truly a double-edged
sword, available to the People as well. Certainly the public interest de-
manded this much, for a jury composed of individuals who would refuse
convicted of the murders resulting from the riot in Haymarket Square. In this case,
981 jurors were called to the box; 757 were excused for cause, and 212 were challenged
peremptorily.
42 People v. Moretti, 6 111. 2d 494, 129 NZE.2d 709 (1955).
4 3 Wildman, Selection and Examination of Jurors, 5 DE PAuL L. REV. 32, 33 (1955).
44 Supra note 1.
45 People v. Kestian, 335 Ill. 596, 167 N.E. 786 (1929).
46People v. Looney, 314 Ill. 150, 145 N.E. 365 (1924).
47 Coughlin v. People, 144 Ill. 140, 33 N.E. 1 (1893).
48 People v. Redola, 300 I11. 392, 133 N.E. 292 (1921).
49 Supra note 47. 50 Ibid.
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to convict upon circumstantial evidence, 51 or because the punishment was
too severe,52 would be a mockery. A trial conducted under these condi-
tions would be a fraud upon the People.
Though the practice of propounding interrogatories based upon mat-
ters of law was widely accepted and regularly employed prior to 1958, it
was regarded by those who drafted Rule 24-1, as "one of the most per-
nicious practices engaged in by many attorneys. '55 Such questions, they
reasoned, tended only to confuse the jury, and were of no aid in "arriving
at the legitimate purpose of the voir dire . . ., The validity of this con-
tention shall be examined shortly.
TRIAL BY JURY
It is with this general understanding of Rule 24-1, that we begin our
inquiry into its constitutional ramifications, turning first to that ancient
right of trial by jury. In anticipation of any possible misunderstanding, it
should be made clear at the outset that the right to which reference is
made is that which is specified in the Illinois Constitution.55 Since Justice
Cardozo spoke in Palko v. Connecticut,5 it has been settled that the fed-
eral guarantees of jury trial57 have no bearing upon the states. One might
well conjecture that in this day of the Warren Court, should the position
be re-examined, a different result would obtain. But, as it is not our
purpose here to rely upon conjecture, it is to the states we must turn, for
through their respective constitutions the right of jury trial extends uni-
versally to these bodies.5 8
In Illinois, the command is strong and certain: "The right of trial by
jury as heretofore enjoyed, shall remain inviolate . . ."59 This right is of a
fundamental nature,60 and one that is highly favored by the law.61 Our
difficulty arises not with the command, but in the interpretation of those
controversial words, heretofore enjoyed. To which point in time did the
framers refer? Or, to phrase the question differently; to which of the con-
comitants of jury trial does the inviolate command attach? In People v.
George,62 it was determined that the only rights of jury trial which were
51 Supra note 29. 54 d. at 8.
52 Supra note 30. 55 IL. CONST. art. 2, §§ 5, 9.
53 Supra note 2 at 7. 56 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
57 U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2; amend. VI.
5 8 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 297 (1929).
59 ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 5.
60Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 I11. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954).
61 People v. Jameson, 387 INI. 367, 56 NE.2d 790 (1944).
62 167 Il1. 447, 47 N.E. 741 (1897).
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rendered inviolate were those known at common law. Clearly, the right
of challenge was thus known, and since the right to examine prospective
jurors was implicit in its intelligent exercise, 3 both would logically be
entitled to that inviolate status set forth in our bill of rights.
However, when the constitutionality of the Voir Dire Rule was raised
in People v. Lobb,64 a new interpretation was forthcoming. The court
concluded that the guarantee of jury trial was "not so inelastic as to ren-
der unchangeable every characteristic and specification of the common-
law jury system."65 True, there were certain essentials which had to be
met: the facts must be determined by twelve impartial jurors who are
qualified and selected in a manner prescribed by law, the verdict must be
unanimous, and the proceeding must be conducted under the superin-
tendence of a judge.66 But, the court could view nothing in the constitu-
tional guarantee that prevented "reasonable regulation of the manner in
which jurors shall be selected. '67
Though it could hardly be expected that the body responsible for the
promulgation of the rule would strike it down the following year,
the contradiction in the Lobb case is at once apparent. In one breath the
requirement of twelve impartial jurors is held to be inviolate, while in
the next, the manner of selection is deemed relatively unimportant. Are
not they one of the same, entitled to equal rank? Is it possible to achieve
such noble ends without utmost concern for the means? Or, did the court
imagine that like Minerva, these twelve impartial jurors would leap forth
from the brain of Jupiter, mature and in complete armor. Whatever the
intent might be, the result is the same. Without constitutional guarantee
of a fair and impartial mode of selection, the command of an impartial
jury is rendered illusory.
This obviously cannot be allowed, for the right to trial by an impartial
jury is not a mere formality, but is a substantial part of the law of the
land.68 It is a right that is guaranteed the accused in all criminal prosecu-
tions, 9 and, prior to 1930, could not be waived, even at his insistence.70
63 Supra note 32. 64 17 I1. 2d 287, 161 N.E.2d 325 (1959).
65 Id. at 299. 66 Id. at 298. 67 Id. at 302.
68People v. Hoffman, 379 Ill. 318, 40 N.E.2d 515 (1942).
69 ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 9: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
right to ... a speedy public trial by an impartial jury ...
7oPeople ex rel Swanson v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 250, 172 N.E. 722 (1930). In this landmark
case, the defendant appeared before Judge Harry M. Fisher under an indictment for
rape, and waived a jury trial. When he was found not guilty, the People sought a
writ of mandamus commanding Judge Fisher to expunge from the records of the crimi-
nal court, the proceedings resulting in the defendant's discharge. On appeal, the court
held that a jury trial was not mandatory, reasoning, that since an accused could plead
guilty and waive any trial, the waiver of any trial included the waiver of a jury trial.
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To further insure that an impartial jury would, in fact, be selected, the
legislature provided a statutory right of premptory challenge to be exer-
cised by the People, as well as by the accused. 71
How was it possible then, for the court to recognize in Lobb the dictate
of impartiality, and yet fail to see that the limitations imposed by Rule
24-1 could only minimize its observance? Counsel could not be expected
effectively to utilize his challenges where he is denied the opportunity to
probe for that bias which he regards most unfavorable to his case. Though
the prohibition as to matters of law applied only to counsel, allowing such
questions to be asked by the judge72 did not remove the conflict. Since
the court exercises no challenges,73 it should not probe for bias. Such
would appear to be more properly the function and prerogative of coun-
sel, an essential ingredient of that right to counsel to which the criminally
accused is entitled.
RIGHT 'TO COUNSEL
Turning now to an area marked by change and ferment, one soon per-
ceives that in contrast to that ancient right of jury trial, the right to
counsel is clearly a modern innovation. Though unknown to the common
law, at least in felony cases,74 it was recognized in America in at least
twelve of the original colonies, 75 and considered to be of sufficient value
to be embodied within the Constitution.76 However, the sixth amendment
gave slight aid to state litigants. The classical theory, as expounded by
Justice Marshall in Barron v. Baltimore,77 viewed the Bill of Rights as a
limitation upon the federal establishment only, and was held to be in-
applicable to the states.
With the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, new vistas were
opened, and though Marshall's interpretation gave no quarter, the advance
could not be halted. In 1932, in the celebrated Scottsboro cases,7 8 the
right to counsel in capital cases was made obligatory upon the states
71 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, S 115-4(e) provides that the number of peremptory chal-
lenges allowed each p arty shall be: twenty in capital cases; ten in those cases in which
punishment may be by imprisonment in the penitentiary; and five in all others.
72 Supra note 1.
73 Von Blaricum v. People, 16 II1. 364 (1855).
74 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 326 (3rd ed. 1922). It was, however,
recognized in both civil cases and misdemeanors, though Blackstone did not himself
understand why "assistance be denied to have the life of a man, which yet (is) allowed
him in prosecutions for every petty trespass." 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 355
(12th ed. 1794).
7 5 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
76 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
7732 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833). 78Supra note 75.
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through the due process clause. The Court reasoned that of those essen-
tial elements of due process-jurisdiction, notice, and hearing-the latter
would be "of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard
by counsel."79 Though in the years that followed numerous attempts
were made to extend this holding to all state prosecutions, they were all
unavailing until the Court obliterated the distinction between capital and
noncapital felonies in Gideon v. Wainwright.s0
Though Illinois had long recognized the right to counsel in all criminal
prosecutions, 81 the effect of Gideon cannot be minimized. Its implications
were two-fold. First, it brought to bear upon our state tribunals that entire
body of federal constitutional law encompassing the right to counsel.
Secondly, by making the United States Supreme Court the ultimate
arbiter of whether the right had been respected, it gave the accused, in
those cases where deprivation had resulted, an added court of review.
All of this, of course, is rather elementary, but when viewed in relation
to our Voir Dire Rule, it takes on added significance. Recognizing the
natural reluctance of any court to strike down its own rules of procedure,
in light of Gideon, it is possible that the Illinois Supreme Court may
wish to reconsider its earlier position before the matter is brought before
the ultimate arbiter in Washington. It should be recalled that in People
v. Lobb,82 the rule was considered only in connection with the guarantee
of jury trial, and the holding did not touch upon the right to counsel.
It is hoped that the court will now avail itself of the opportunity to re-
examine the rule along this line.
The provisions guaranteeing the right to counsel cannot be viewed as
"mere empty formalities. '8 3 Effective representation is contemplated as
well, and at every stage of the proceeding where such assistance is essen-
tial.84 That the impaneling of the jury falls within this rule can hardly
be denied. If this were not so, the accused would not be able to secure
that fair and impartial jury guaranteed by our constitution.
In Chandler v. Fretag,8 the Court set forth the general proposition
that the right to counsel included the right to be heard through the
mouth of counsel. This command cannot be obeyed in an impaneling
procedure which restricts the scope of inquiry to those questions which
79 Id. at 69. 81 ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 9.
80 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 82 Supra note 64.
83 People v. Nitti, 312 Ill. 73, 143 N.E. 448 (1924).
84 Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955);
People v. Moore, 405 111. 220, 89 N.E.2d 731 (1950). The time of attachment was, of
course, extended in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964), to that point where
".... the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect..." See Note, 14 DE PAUL L. REv. 187 (1964).
85 348 U.S. 3 (1954)
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the court thinks necessary There can be no degree of effectiveness on
behalf of counsel when he is denied the opportunity to elicit that infor-
mation which will enable him to exercise his challenges intelligently. It
would be a delusion of grand proportion to conclude, under such cir-
cumstances, that the accused could possibly avail himself of the right to
be heard through the mouth of counsel.
A further point warrants mention. It is a maxim of the law, that when-
ever a right exists in one person, a corresponding duty rests upon another
person or group of persons. Applying this rule to the subject at hand, it
becomes apparent that devolving upon counsel is the duty to secure for
his client that type of juror so highly regarded. As this duty rests not
with the court, but upon counsel alone, it is uppermost that these jurors
conform to his test of fairness and impartiality.86 Clearly, this is not likely
under the present voir dire procedure, and where the discharge of this
duty is unreasonably hampered, the right to counsel is obviously
abridged. s7
This is not to suggest that the right to effective assistance by counsel
knows no bounds. Its exercise, like the exercise of any right, must be
tempered with the interests of society. We do not speak in absolutes.
It is a balance which must be struck. Though the deep-seated power of
our courts to adopt reasonable rules of procedure cannot be denied,88
their enforcement must not abuse the time-honored rights of the accused.8 9
Supreme Court Rule 24-1 appears to meet neither test. On the contrary,
it offends a "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."90
CONCLUSION
What then, is proposed to take its place? At the risk of being saddled
with the label of "reactionary," it is suggested that the Donovan rule9'
be raised from its slumber to occupy the position to which it is entitled.
It is in the Donovan case that the proper balance may best be restored,
for it affords counsel the widest of latitude in his examination, subject
only to the sound judgement and judicial discretion of the presiding judge.
It was noted early in this comment that the present rule regulating the
voir dire was the product of understandable concern over scandalous de-
lays. Though one could hardly deny the existence of this problem in
86 Busch, Selecting the Jury, 47 ILL. B.J. 238 (1958).
87 1 THOMPSON, TRIALS 106 (Early, 2nd ed. 1918).
88 Prindeville v. People, 42 Ill. 217 (1866).
89 People v. Jennings, 312 II. 606, 144 N.E. 316 (1924).
90 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1933).
91 Supra notes 7 and 36.
